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Abstract:
One of the important strategic decisions of TNCs in entering emerging markets is
product differentiation in relation to growth in incomes and type of competition
expected from local firms. This paper develops a simple theory in the context of
the Indian economy that has opened up recently to competition. Being protected
from potential competition in the pre-reform era, local incumbents do not have the
usual incumbency advantages. Saddled with sunk costs in sub-international
product lines, they cannot price-compete if new entrant TNCs position their
product qualities sufficiently high. This and the fact that income growth swells the
income of the middle classes are used to generate two hypotheses: 1. New entrant
TNCs enjoy higher income elasticity for their products. 2. They face price
elasticity similar to locals' unless there are too many TNCs competing in the same
generic market. The hypotheses are tested on the basis of firm level panel data for
five consumer durable goods industries.
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1. Introduction
In entering an emerging economy, TNCs need to choose the right level of product
differentiation. If selling products with identical quality, they are assured of stiff
competition particularly in those markets where local firms are well-established with
developed distribution networks. Even with higher production efficiency, winning
through price competition is extremely costly if competitors have well-entrenched
distribution networks. We will argue that the rapid growth of income in emerging
countries, which expands the consumer markets for more income-elastic products,
coupled with the fact that local incumbents are stuck with large sunk costs in their
existing product lines, leads to a natural strategy of product quality choice for TNCs.
There is a small body of literature which attempts to apply industrial organization theory
to international business issues (for example see Graham, 1998). There is also a large
literature in international business, which gives importance to country specific
institutional issues in understanding entry decisions of TNCs into emerging economies
(Dunning, 1988; Luo and Peng, 1999; Beamish, 1998; Patibandla, 2001). Following these
strands of the literature, we develop a simple argument to explain the choice of product
quality and prices by newly entrant TNCs in the Indian economy. India presents an
interesting case for this exercise because since the inception of economic reforms in
1991, GDP has been growing at an average annual rate of 6 percent. Secondly, there is a
strong presence of local firms in most industries (Dawar and Frost, 1999).
In the literature on sequential entry, the incumbent is taken to have advantage over new
entrants owing to lower cost and to lower price elasticity for its product relative to new
entrants. Low cost advantage arises from accumulated learning economies in production
internalized by the incumbent and lower price elasticity arises from consumer inertia,
switching costs in consumption, and brand allegiance. Incumbents’ advantage is further
4enhanced by strategic pre-emptive activities that constrain entry and subsequent moves of
later entrants (Schmalensee, 1978, Donnenfeld and Weber,1992).
This perception of incumbency advantage needs qualification in the case of TNCs
entering an emerging economy which was erstwhile under a protectionist regime. Indian
markets became open to foreign companies only recently as a result of the reforms. Until
then, these markets were protected by an industrial licensing regime that functioned as
entry barrier (Ghemawat and Patibandla, 1999). Incumbents in domestic industries thus
worked without much concern for potential competition2. As a consequence, at the
inception of reform their costs or product position in the quality space were not typical of
incumbents modeled in the theoretical literature on sequential entry, where the fear of
potential entry shapes the product differentiation strategy of an existing firm. Instead, we
observe quality-price combinations more akin to monopolists or cartelised oligopolies.
Besides, the pre-reform import-substituting package of the government protected
domestic producers from imports as well, resulting in product quality below international
standards (Bhagwati, 1993). Thus even though incumbents enjoyed a large domestic
market, they did not generate significant brand loyalty that could be used against new
entrant TNCs in the post-reform era. On the other hand, given the large size of the Indian
market, incumbents had significant sunk costs in production capacity that would act
against quick adaptation of product quality or product innovation in the post-reform era.
In this situation, potential entrants are not as seriously disadvantaged as in received
theory. Also new entrants in our case are TNC’s who have already developed and
marketed elsewhere the products that they consider for the newly-opened market.
Together these factors introduce an asymmetry to the advantage rather than disadvantage
of potential entrants. For changing product specification or improving quality, an
incumbent has to grapple with significant sunk costs in existing product lines. On the
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5other hand a TNC contemplating entry looks at the range of qualities in the product
market as an ex ante choice without any sunk costs constraining it 3.
Secondly the income growth process in emerging countries swell the number of
households in the middle income groups faster. These groups comprise the lower end of
the consumer durables market. For faster growth of market share, TNCs need to set their
price/quality ratio such that they can attract the fast growing lower part of the market.
Failing this, they would sell only to the higher income end of the market. That would
mean that the TNC's market share grows more slowly than the incumbent's. We argue
that this process of income growth in the market and the contrasting nature of cost curves
of new entrants and incumbents determine the price/ quality ratio of TNCs.
The purpose of our paper is to use these specificities to explain the nature of demand
faced by both local incumbents and TNCs for consumer durables market in India in the
post-reform period. In section 2 we examine the choices regarding product differentiation
or quality available to a new entrant TNC on the basis of typical relative cost situations of
TNCs and incumbents. Then we analyse the potential entrants’ decision about
price/quality ratio on the assumption that they expect a rapid growth in consumer income.
These considerations are used to generate two testable propositions in section 3. In
section 4 we test these propositions using firm level panel data for Indian durable
consumer goods industry. Section 5 concludes with some discussion.
2. Choice of Product Quality
1. Consider the generic market for a durable consumer item. We assume that the hedonic
attributes underlying each product in this generic market are summarized by a scalar
measure q called quality4.
Assume that average and marginal costs of production are increasing functions of quality.
The incumbent’s average cost, denoted c1 (q) for producing one unit of each quality is
shown by the curve C1 in figure 1. A potential newcomer’s average cost curve is shown
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6in figure 1 as C2, and the function is denoted by c2(q). Suppose at the start of the reforms
the local incumbent, a monopolist or a cartelised oligopoly, was producing quality q0 at
price p0. The sale price p0 in the protected pre-reform stage is shown in the figure as
higher than the incumbent’s average cost c0 for quality q0, implying positive economic
profit.
At the ex ante or capacity planning stage, a potential entrant’s average cost curve is the
envelope of average cost curves for different qualities, and is therefore flatter than the
incumbent’s, except in a close neighborhood of q0.  Relative positions of C1 and C2 close
to q0 reflects the advantage of internalized economies of scale achieved by the incumbent
before the newcomer’s entry. CI increases slowly up to some qa >q0 , and thereafter
becomes steeper. This is to take account of the fact that given its technology and plant
capacity, the incumbent can make neighborhood variations in quality without much
additional cost. But beyond some quality qa, average cost for higher quality products
increases steeply.
2. Assume that potential consumers have identical preferences but are differentiated in
terms of income, y.  They each buy one unit of the product or none at all5. If one unit of
the product of quality q is sold at price p, the consumer surplus of a buyer of income y is
S = yq - p. This surplus function implies that consumers are vertically differentiated6.
Assume that income is continuously distributed with density f(y) over the range (y, Y).
When quality q0 is offered at price p0, all buyers for whom S =  yq0 – p0 ≥ 0, are expected
to buy the product. Thus all potential buyers for whom y ≥  p0/q0 are expected to make a
purchase, unless there is another product offering higher S. Therefore in the pre-reform
stage the incumbent, selling a quality q0 at price p0 faces a market size ∫Y qp dyyf00 / )( .
3. A potential entrant takes the cost function of the incumbent and its own ex ante cost
function as given and known, and chooses a quality range and price. Since quality
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7decision implies committing to a plant size, the TNC makes an assumption about the long
run response of the incumbent, namely that in the long run the incumbent can be forced
to price-compete, either by intense advertising effort or by developing the TNC's own
distribution network.
To examine how the TNC chooses product quality, we partition the quality axis into three
segments: q< q0 ; q0 ≤ q ≤ qa ; qa <q . Since quality q0 is below international standards,
products below q0 cannot be exported, and thus reduce the future marketing options for
the TNC. So the segment q< q0 is ruled out. In the next segment, q0 ≤ q ≤ qa , the
incumbent has a short run cost advantage. Thus the newcomer is left with the third
segment, qa <q to build capacity, if at all.
Within this quality range, the TNC can set either, p /q >p0 /q0 or p /q <p0 /q0 with two
different market implications.
(A)  p /q >p0 /q0: TNC's product breaks even with buyers at y = p /q, which is higher than
p0/q0. So the consumer surplus from the incumbent’s product remains higher than that of
the newcomer for income lower than y ′ = (p-p0)/ (q – q0 ). Therefore the market is
partitioned at this point (see Figure 2, left panel). Market shares of the incumbent and the
newcomer would be respectively ∫ ′y qp o dyyf/0 )(  and f y dyyY ( )′∫  as shown in figure 3. Thus
in this case the entrant TNC ends up occupying only the higher end of the market.
(B) p/q < p0/q0: TNC's product breaks even with buyers at y = p /q, which is lower than
p0 /q0.  Therefore the TNC not only competes in the entire market but also extends the
market to a group of customers with lower income (see right panel, Figure 2).
In response to the new entry, the incumbent may not reduce price immediately and rather
use its distribution network to continue to market q0 at price p0. But the entrant assumes
that through intense advertisement and by developing its own distribution network, it can
force the incumbent to price-compete in the long run. In that case the lowest price the
incumbent can afford is c0. The TNC has to choose its capacity today so that it can keep
its p/q below c0/q0 in the long run. Initially it begins by setting p/q < p0/q0, and as the
incumbent reduces its price, the TNC also reduces price keeping its p/q ratio always
lower than the incumbent's.  From figure 1, we can see that the newcomer can afford to
                                                                                                                                                
8do this only for the range of qualities between qa and qb. Between these points the
newcomer’s average cost to quality ratio is less than that of the line L. Qualities beyond
qb have an average cost that does not allow them to be sold at a price satisfying p/q <
c0/q0 without loss. Thus if the TNC wants to compete for the entire market and not
occupy only the higher end of it, its quality choice can not be far away from the quality
sold by the incumbent.
In this case TNC sells to a lower segment of the market where the incumbent can not sell,
and in the rest of the market they compete- the TNC with lower price /quality ratio, and
the incumbent with its distribution network.
3. Testable Hypotheses
We hypothesize that in Indian consumer durables markets, TNCs opt for competing in the
entire market rather than cutting out a niche at the upper end of it, by offering lower
price/quality ratio than incumbents. Since quality as a variable features in the hypothesis,
it cannot be directly established. Before proposing a test based on observable variables,
we state the informal reasons that suggest this hypothesis as a prima facie possibility.
Features of the income distribution for households comprising the Indian consumer
durables market makes it more likely that TNCs would choose the said price/quality
option. The relevant income range comprises relatively high-income households (top 8 to
10 per cent of income earners). Over this range income distribution is relatively denser
towards the lower end. The higher end featuring very high income has relatively lower
density. Also households with very high income often buy their durables from outside the
domestic market, reducing the effective density of this part further.
Additionally, over the last decade GDP has grown at an annual average rate of 6.0
percent. Most of this income growth has swelled the size of the middle class, located at
the lower end of the consumer durables market (Natarajan,1998)7. It implies that the
density f(y) is higher and also increasing faster for lower values of y in the consumer
durables market. This trend is expected to continue in the medium run.
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9In this market, an entrant who partitions the market and takes a position at the relatively
higher end (p/q>p0/q0) will face a slower growing market than the incumbent. Thus for a
potential entrant with a reasonably long horizon, we might expect the choice p/q<p0/q0.
Casual observations in the market place also suggest that the TNC products are not priced
away for the higher niche of the market. Similarly media advertisements by TNCs and
local incumbents appear to have the same target groups.
If the hypothesis is true, then we expect the TNCs to have a higher income elasticity of
demand for their products compared to local incumbents. As explained in the last section,
in this case while TNC and the incumbent compete in one part of the market and face
similar demand situation, in the lower end of the market it is the TNC alone who sells.
Any given aggregate growth of income swells this latter part of the market more, thus
making TNC's market demand more income elastic than the incumbent's.
Difference in the price elasticity of demand faced by the two is not as clear-cut. In the
part of the market where both the TNC and the incumbent are selling, unit price increase
by the incumbent makes him lose a larger group of customers because its quality is
poorer. But while the TNC would lose fewer customers in this part of the market, it will
also lose some additional customers in the lower part of the market where it alone sells.
The net effect can be precisely worked out if the prices p and p0 are given, but in general
the effect is indeterminate. However the effect is tractable if there are a number of TNCs
operating in the market. In that case it is likely that the competing TNCs will face higher
price elasticity. The reason is that on price increase each TNC loses customers out to
other TNCs whose product quality is close to its own and provides near substitutes. This
added to similar losses in the lower end of the market too, will be larger than the sale loss
of an incumbent on price increase. We would therefore expect that in industries with a
larger proportion of TNCs, they face price elasticity larger than incumbent's.
We now propose two hypotheses in statistically verifiable form:
Hypothesis 1: TNCs face larger income elasticity of demand than local incumbents.
Hypothesis 2: TNCs face larger price elasticity than incumbents if the proportion of
TNCs in the industry is large.
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4.1 Empirical  Analysis
The two hypotheses are tested by estimating separate loglinear demand functions for each
industry. The demand function allows for difference in income and price elasticity
between TNCs and locals by using binary variables which take value zero for locals and
1 otherwise. The equation estimated is
log Q = α +β1logY + β2 log P + β3 D*logy + β4D*logP+ ε
where Q = quantity sold, Y = consumer income proxied by GDP, P = price, D is a binary
variable and ε is a random error term with usual properties.
For hypothesis 1 to be non-rejectable we require the estimate of β3 positive and
significant. For hypothesis 2 to be non-rejectable we require the estimate of β4 to be
negative and significant in industries where the proportion of TNCs is large.
4.2. Data and Empirical Results
Firm level panel data were collected for five consumer durable industries for the period
1990 to 1999 from the publications of the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy
(CMIE) on the Indian corporate sector. These industries are Air-conditioners (A), Motor
Cycles (M), Passenger Cars (P), Refrigerators (R), and Washing Machines (W). We use
data on these five industries because we could identify only five consumer durable
industries where there has been new entrant TNCs with a few years of operation in the
Indian market. Firms with foreign equity above 40 per cent have been treated as MNC
subsidiaries8. CMIE data presents a complete coverage of the corporate sector, and the data
for these industries represents the whole population in these industries. Table1 provides
information on the number of firms and new entrant TNCs in these industries. In two
industries, passenger cars (P) and motorcycles (M) the number of TNCs are fifty per cent
or more of the total number of units in the industry.
The data on prices for each firm has been generated by dividing sales revenue by the
number of units sold. Since products are differentiated, absolute values of prices and
quantities across firms are not comparable. This is why the demand function used for
estimation is in exponential form, which is converted to a loglinear form for estimation.
                                                
8 Maximum permissible foreign equity holding has increased generally since the reforms started. We adopt
the 40 per cent definition because that was the threshold at the beginning of our sample period.
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Panel data has several advantages for our exercise as it utilizes information on both the
inter-temporal dynamics and the individuality of firms (Cheng, 1986). In particular, recall
that our hypothesis about the income elasticity of demand is based on income growth
over time.
The log linear demand functions estimated for the sample industries are reported in Table
2. The results are statistically significant. The statistically significant negative and
positive signs of the estimated coefficients of the price and income variables imply that
the demand function is well identified.  Estimated coefficients for D*log Y are positive
and significant in all industries. This provides strong support to our first hypothesis.
Estimated coefficients for the interactive term D*log P is negative and significant only in
two industries P and M, and is insignificant in all others. As stated earlier, fifty per cent
or more units in these two industries are TNCs. In other industries the proportion is much
lower. This provides a strong evidence for our second hypothesis.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a simple theory of strategic choices of TNCs in product
differentiation and price setting in an emerging economy, which has recently opened up
to competition. We assumed that entry choice is made with the knowledge of future
growth in incomes and the product choices that were already made by incumbent local
firms in the past. We argued that new entrant TNCs enjoy higher income elasticity for
their differentiated products than local firms given the typical nature of incumbents'
technology and the income growth process. TNCs in general face the same price
elasticity unless too many TNC units enter the same generic market. The empirical results
provide significant support to these hypotheses.
Essentially we focused on two different elements of the emerging economy scenario. The
first is that incumbents have a large sunk cost in pre-existing product lines which disables
them from competing effectively if TNCs introduce sufficiently higher qualities.
Secondly, having ensured that incumbents cannot price-compete against the higher
qualities, TNCs can aim to compete for the whole market and even further extend it by
offering lower price/quality ratio than incumbents. This latter strategy of pricing becomes
12
attractive given the rapid income growth and concentration of that growth at the lower
end of the durable consumer goods market.
Arguments used here are quite distinct from those in standard models of strategic entry in
a competitive market, where incumbents have significant advantage. The argument is
expected, a priori, to hold in many emerging countries with a rapid income growth
process and an earlier history of import substitution and protection. On the other hand the
argument evidently does not hold in a country where industry has remained open to
foreign investment for a long period, even if it is an emerging economy. It may be
worthwhile to explore in future research how general the process is.
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Table 1. The Sample
Industry Total number
of firms
Number of
TNCs
A 5 1
M 4 2
P 9 5
R 4 1
W 5 2
Table 2: Log Linear Demand Functions
Dependent Variable: log Q
Industry Constant Log P Log Y D* logY D*log P Adjusted R2
A 1.3
(1.2)
-0.56
(6.9)*
0.82
(4.5)*
1.68
(3.3)*
-1.1
(0.2)
0.92
M -10
(7.5)*
-0.8
(1.8)**
1.4
(5.3)*
1.0
(2.8)*
-1.5
(2.0)*
0.93
P -6.1
(1.8)**
-0.2
(0.4)
0.5
(1.0)
2.2
(2.8)*
-1.2
(1.6)**
0.78
R -4.1
(4.1)*
-1.4
(10)*
1.4
(8.1)
0.4
(2.2)*
-0.6
(1.0)
0.90
W -8.6
(4.0)*
-2.0
(15)*
1.3
(3.5)*
0.6
(8.1)*
1.0
(3.9)
0.95
Figures in the parentheses are t values.
* significant at 0.01 and ** significant at 0.05 levels.
